Discrimination
Lewis-Williams v. BART (9th Cir., 2026): $7.8M Verdict on Religious Vaccine Accommodations Upheld
Updated
In Lewis-Williams v. San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a jury verdict of roughly $7.8 million for six former transit employees on their Title VII and FEHA failure-to-accommodate claims, arising from religious objections to a COVID—19 vaccine mandate. The court held that the employer was entitled to neither judgment as a matter of law nor a new trial, and it affirmed the district court’s order of front pay for one plaintiff.
Background
In October 2021, the San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District (BART) adopted a policy requiring employees to be vaccinated against COVID—19, subject to medical and religious exemptions. BART’s Leave Management Department reviewed exemption requests and identified about 70 employees who potentially qualified, but it concluded that it could not accommodate any of them without undue hardship.
Employees who received that determination were told to take the vaccine or lose their jobs. Some complied; the rest resigned, retired, or were terminated. A group of former employees then sued, asserting failure-to-accommodate claims under Title VII and FEHA and a free exercise claim under Section 1983.
The district court granted BART summary judgment on the Section 1983 claim. After an earlier trial ended with a mistrial on the undue-hardship defense, the court held a second trial for the six remaining plaintiffs. The jury found that BART had not established undue hardship and returned a verdict totaling roughly $7.8 million. BART’s motions for judgment as a matter of law and a new trial were denied.
What the Court Held on Undue Hardship
Reviewing the denial of judgment as a matter of law de novo, the Ninth Circuit asked whether the evidence, viewed in the plaintiffs’ favor, permitted only one reasonable conclusion contrary to the verdict. It held that it did not.
Under Groff v. DeJoy, the court explained, an employer proves undue hardship only by showing that an accommodation would impose a burden that is substantial, excessive, or unjustifiable. Applied here, that meant BART had to show that alternatives to vaccination would be less safe not merely by some margin, but by a substantial, excessive, or unjustifiable one.
The court concluded that showing the vaccine was the most effective measure did not make less effective precautions per se unreasonable. It also noted that the public health guidance BART relied on was not in the record, and that the jury was not required to accept BART’s after-the-fact expert testimony as conclusive.
Because BART is in the transportation business rather than health and safety, and because the six employees held roles requiring minimal close contact with the public or coworkers, the court found substantial evidence supported the jury’s verdict. It distinguished its earlier decisions in Petersen and Williams, which involved firefighters and hospital workers.
To prove undue hardship under Title VII, an employer must show that alternatives to vaccination would be less safe by a substantial, excessive, or unjustifiable margin. Reliance on public health guidance is entitled to weight but is not dispositive, and the undue-hardship question is a fact-specific inquiry generally suited to jury resolution.
New Trial, Front Pay, and the Cross-Appeal
The court held that BART was not entitled to a new trial. The verdict was not against the clear weight of the evidence, and although plaintiffs’ counsel violated an order in limine three times during the second phase, the trial court sustained each objection and gave curative instructions. Because those violations occurred after the undue-hardship phase, the court found no prejudice warranting a new trial.
The court also held it was not plain error to order front pay for one plaintiff, whose counsel had elected that remedy below; awarding reinstatement on top of the money award would have produced an impermissible double recovery. Having affirmed the verdict, the court found the employees’ cross-appeal on their free exercise claim moot and did not reach it.
Judge R. Nelson concurred separately to explain why he viewed the district court’s free exercise analysis as troubling, noting that circuit precedent has rejected the “unfettered discretion” test the district court applied. That discussion appears only in the concurrence and is not part of the panel’s holding.
What This Means for You
This decision addresses how the undue-hardship defense operates in Title VII and FEHA religious-accommodation disputes, holding that an employer must show alternatives to a vaccine mandate were less safe by a substantial, excessive, or unjustifiable margin. It also confirms that reliance on public health guidance carries weight but is not conclusive, and that the undue-hardship question is generally one for the jury.
I write these summaries as general information about developments in California employment law. They are not legal advice and don’t create a mediator–client relationship. For guidance on a specific matter, consult a qualified attorney.